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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper before the Utah Supreme Court in this case under Utah Code
§ 78A-3-102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE #1:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that under a lease

designed to secure a dependable retirement income to the Brown family; that obligates
the Tenant to pay rent each month "without offset;" that consistently requires that "the
amount of annual rent will be paid without offset and that tenant will pay all imposition
and cost relating to the property so that the Landlord has no cost or expense relating to
the property during the term or an extension of the lease" and which entitled the tenant to
contest any covenant, restriction or condition "now or hereafter of record," so long as it
did so at "its own expense," the Tenant had a duty not to embroil the Landlord in a costly
dispute over a chimerical easement.
Standard of Review: This question is a mixed question of fact and law which this
Court reviews for clear error and correctness, respectively. Vial v. Provo City, 2009 UT
App 122, f 10, 210 P.3d 947.
ISSUE #2:

Whether a long term lease, with an option to purchase, may confer

legal standing on a tenant to litigate property rights originally possessed by a landlord.
Standard of Review: This question is a question of law which is determined by
this Court under a correctness standard. Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT
5,17,201P.3dl004.
1

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no applicable constitutional or statutory provisions involved in this
appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Petitioner Holladay Towne Center, L.L.C., ("HTC") is the tenant under a long
term lease agreement ("Ground Lease") with an option to purchase entered into between
HTC and Brown Family Holdings, L.C. ("Brown"). HTC brought this action claiming
that Brown breached the Ground Lease by refusing to pursue a quiet title action against a
person unknown to either party, who had never asserted an easement over the leased
property, where an easement was not visible on the ground, and where the supposed
easement was never recorded against the property.
In granting Certiorari, this Court delineated two issues:
1.
Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the lease at issue in
this case encompassed any subsequently discovered potential
encumbrances and assigned the responsibility for legally resolving them to
the tenant Petitioner.
2.
Whether a lease may confer legal standing on a tenant to litigate
property rights originally possessed by a landlord.
See, Supreme Court Order granting Certiorari, attached as Addendum C to Appellant's
Brief. Significantly, whether there is an easement on Lot 27 is not among the issues for
which Petitioner sought for or was granted Certiorari review. Yet, in the relief sought,
Petitioner asks this Court to:
2

...reverse the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and remand this matter
with instructions for the trial court to enter a judgment determining the
easement to be an encumbrance on Brown's fee simple ownership that
Brown is required to remedy in order to comply with representations made
in the Lease as to the quality of title held.
See, Appellant's Brief, p. 29.
Petitioner no doubt senses that success on any of the issues for which it sought
Certiorari review would be only a Pyrrhic victory since a remand on either of those issues
would result in reinstatement of the judgment below on the Trial Court's alternative
ground that there is no easement on Lot 27. The linchpin of every argument made by
HTC is the false assumption that there is an easement across Lot 27. Put this fact away
and all of HTC's arguments fail. Unfortunately for HTC, the Trial Court did exactly that.
The Trial Court specifically found that "[tjhere is no easement on lot 27. There is no
evidence of an easement on the ground and to the extent that an easement purporting to
affect lot 27 is recorded against lot 26, that easement is void because it was not recorded
against lot 27." R. at 827, Conclusions of Law, f 1. It further found that "Because there
is no easement affecting lot 27, there is no basis for HTC's claims against the defendant
and this action should not have been brought against the landlord, causing the landlord to
incur costs." R. at 827, Conclusions of Law, f 2. These findings by the Trial Court are
not at issue on this petition for review. The effect of this unchallenged fact is obvious.
Brown cannot have breached the Ground Lease by refusing to bring a quiet title action
with regard to an easement that does not exist under Utah law. Similarly, the question of
standing becomes academic when there is no easement to challenge.
3

Petitioner should have been more honest in its petition for Writ of Certiorari and
asked this Court to review the issue of whether there was an easement across Lot 27
rather than trying to get the Trial Court's decision on this central issue reversed through
the back door.
Petitioner's failure to be completely candid in what it was requesting this Court to
do in its Petition for Certiorari leads to another difficulty for this Court. That is, the
Court is being asked to render what is essentially an advisory opinion. This
Court's "settled policy is to avoid giving advisory opinions in regard to issues
unnecessary to the resolution of the claims before us." Summit Water Distribution Co. v.
Summit County, 123 P.3d 437, 452 (Utah 2005), citing, Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004
UT 102, f 25, 104 P.3d 1242. Since a perusal of Petitioner's brief reveals that there is no
way that a decision on any of the issues for which Certiorari review was granted can
result in a judgment in favor of the Petitioner when there is an unchallenged finding by
the Trial Court that there is no easement affecting the property in this case, an opinion on
any of the issues granted would be an advisory opinion.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

HTC filed suit against Brown on August 9, 2006, asserting claims for declaratory
judgment, breach of contract, and specific performance. On September 18, 2006, Brown
filed a motion to dismiss HTC's claims. The motion to dismiss was converted into a
motion for summary judgment because the parties submitted affidavits supporting their
claims. On November 15, 2006, Brown filed a counterclaim against HTC because HTC
4

would not dismiss the lawsuit brought on August 9, 2006, and had engaged in a regular
pattern of withholding rents causing Brown to incur the additional expense of having to
hire a lawyer to demand payment. HTC filed a motion to dismiss Brown's claims. At
about the same time, HTC filed a motion for summary judgment and then Brown filed a
motion for summary judgment.

All the claims were combined into the summary

judgment motions. On March 12, 2007, oral argument was held before the Trial Court.
Oral argument regarding the proposed order and attorney fees was also heard on May 1,
2007.
After a review of the pleadings and oral argument before the Trial Court on March
12, 2007, the Trial Court determined not only that HTC did not have a claim against
Brown, but that in fact there is no easement on Lot 27, the parcel of land that is the
subject of the Ground Lease entered into between these two parties. (R. at 827). The
Trial Court determined that Brown was the prevailing party and awarded attorney fees to
Brown. (R. at 928). The Trial Court also determined that even though HTC's conduct
was not excusable in withholding payments and filing a meritless lawsuit against Brown,
it was not a material breach of the lease agreement because the damages caused to Brown
could be compensated in an award of attorney fees, and the Trial Court dismissed
Brown's counterclaims. (R. at 928). HTC then contested the award of attorney fees and
the proposed order and another hearing was held on May 1, 2007 regarding the order and
the amount of attorney fees awarded. (R. at 928). The Trial Court made a specific award
of attorney fees excluding attorney fees expended after HTC began making rent payments
5

on time. HTC filed a Notice of Appeal on June 18, 2007. Brown filed a Notice of
Appeal on June 27, 2007.
The Court of Appeals, after a review of the pleadings and oral argument, affirmed
the Trial Court's dismissal of HTC's claims and Brown's counterclaim, and they
affirmed the determination that HTC had not materially breached the Ground Lease.
They also affirmed the Trial Court's decision to award attorney fees to Brown below but
reversed the Trial Court's determination of the amount of those fees and remanded for
further proceedings on the amount. They awarded Brown their reasonable attorney fees
incurred in successfully defending against HTC's appeal but declined to award fees to
either party in regards to Brown's cross-appeal. The matter was ordered remanded to the
Trial Court for a determination of fees. See, Court of Appeals' Opinion, f 26, attached as
Addendum B to Appellant's Brief.
On April 23, 2009, the Utah Supreme Court granted HTC's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case arises out of a lawsuit asserted by Holladay Towne Center, L.L.C., a
large developer, against Brown Family Holdings, L.C., an LLC set up by the Brown
family to manage their retirement assets. In March of 2005, HTC and Brown entered into
a lease agreement ("Ground Lease"). The Ground Lease covers only what is described in
the Ground Lease as Lot 27. The Ground Lease expressly gives HTC the right to
challenge, at its own expense, any restrictions or conditions relating to the Subject
6

Property. (R. at 20-21).
The purported easement which HTC claims to be an encumbrance on the Subject
Property does not appear of record on Lot 27. (R. at 543). The only documents of record
with any mention of an easement were recorded against Lot 26, and not Lot 27. (R. at
603-605). None of the conveyances of Lot 27 ever included a reference to the purported
easement on Lot 27. (R. at 613-624). Neither Brown nor HTC had notice of the supposed
easement at the time the Ground Lease was entered into. (R. at 548 and 575). Indeed,
Petitioner obtained a title report from its title insurer before entering into the Ground
Lease. This purported easement was not listed as an exception. (R. at 531 and 591-601).
There is no physical evidence of this purported easement. In fact, the path of the claimed
easement has been blocked for over twenty years by impassable berms, and for the past
ten years the path has been blocked by storage units that Brown lawfully constructed on
Lot 27. (R. at 544). The Trial Court found that:
There is no easement on lot 27. There is no evidence of an easement on the
ground and to the extent that an easement purporting to affect lot 27 is
recorded against lot 26, that easement is void because it was not recorded
against lot 27.
(R. at 827). HTC has never challenged the Trial Court's finding that Lot 27 is not subject
to an easement.
The Ground Lease was drawn with provisions making it clear that whatever HTC
decided to do with the property, it could not do anything that would cause Brown to incur
any cost, and that rent would be paid each month without any offset. (R. at 14). In that
7

regard, the Ground Lease was written as a triple net lease, with the added proviso that
rent would be paid each month without offset, and "tenant agrees that the amount of
annual rent will be paid without offset and that tenant will pay all imposition and cost
relating to the property so that the Landlord has no cost or expense relating to the
property during the term or an extension of the lease." (R. at 14) (Italics added). In the
event of any condition, restriction, or covenant that might later be discovered that would
interfere with Petitioner's plans, the Ground Lease provided that the tenant could deal
with those as it pleased so long as it did so without cost to the Brown family. (R. at 14).
In violation of the clear purpose of the Ground Lease to preserve the Brown
Family retirement income, Petitioner HTC, in an effort to renegotiate the lease terms,
intentionally and repeatedly withheld rent payments until after Brown incurred attorney
fees to demand payment, then filed this frivolous lawsuit which it has now pursued all the
way to this Court, and has refused to shield Brown from cost as it agreed to do in the
Ground Lease. (R. at 14).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Petitioner Holladay Towne Center, L.L.C., prophecies gloom and doom for
the law of Landlord and Tenant in this state if the Court of Appeals decision is not
reversed. HTC can only reach this dire prophecy by leaving out the undisputed and
salient facts of this case. HTC's entire argument relies on their unsupported assertion
that there is an easement on Lot 27, the piece of real property that is the subject of the
Ground Lease between HTC and Brown, when, in fact, there is none.
8

There is no easement on Lot 27. There is no easement recorded, there is no
easement on the ground, there is not even a beneficiary of the supposed easement
asserting its existence. There is no easement anywhere except in the imagination of a
tenant who is trying to force its landlord into renegotiating a lease with an option to
purchase; a lease/option that represents the retirement fund of the Brown family. Given
these undisputed facts, the Trial Court specifically found that there was no easement on
Lot 27. In its petition for Writ of Certiorari, HTC did not challenge the Trial Court's
finding that there is no easement on Lot 27. Yet now, HTC's entire argument hinges on
there being an easement on this property. Because there is no easement on Lot 27,
HTC's entire argument is pointless.
Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals, in its decision, failed to apply
the plain meaning of the term covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs).
Problematically, that term exists nowhere in the Ground Lease and the context of the
Lease where the separate terms are used makes it clear that the language was designed to
put the burden of all such concerns on the Tenant. Indeed, to get to the heart of the
matter, the Ground Lease specifically stated that the "tenant agrees that the amount of
annual rent will be paid without offset and that tenant will pay all imposition and cost
relating to the property so that the Landlord has no cost or expense relating to the
property during the term or an extension of the lease."

(R. at 14) (Italics added).

Whatever might be the technical arguments relating to the meaning of this lease as it
relates to this imaginary easement, HTC has pursued a course of action that has imposed
9

costs and expenses relating to the property during the term of the lease. This course of
action by the Tenant has effectively deprived the Brov/n family of the benefit of their
bargain—a steady retirement income stream on which they could rely.
Similarly, Petitioner HTC tries to argue that this case would have a negative
impact on the law relating to standing. HTC makes this argument by ignoring the reality
that Petitioner holds a long term Ground Lease with an option to purchase that gives it the
right, should it someday exercise that option, to become the fee holder of the property.
This argument also ignores the fact that HTC has the right, under the terms of the Ground
Lease, to contest conditions or restrictions on the property. Given these rights under a
long term Ground Lease with an option to purchase, HTC has standing under Utah law to
deal with this imaginary easement as it sees fit.
ARGUMENT

I.

THERE IS NO EASEMENT ON THE REAL PROPERTY LEASED
BY HTC FROM BROWN.

In March of 2005, HTC and Brown entered into a Ground Lease wherein HTC
leased from Brown a piece of real property described on Exhibit A which is attached to
the Ground Lease (attached as Addendum D to the Appellant's Brief) and legally
described as Lot 27, Peony Gardens ("Lot 27"). The only property that was leased to
HTC by Brown was Lot 27. There is no other real property that was subject to the
Ground Lease entered into between these two parties.
No easement has been recorded against Lot 27. HTC has tried to create a cloud on
10

the title of Lot 27 by reference to documents recorded against a different lot which
reference a purported easement over Lot 27. (R. at 603-605). The documents, entitled
notice of contracts, were recorded against Lot 26, not Lot 27, and included in the legal
description a purported easement over Lot 27. (R. at 603-605; see also R. at 535-536).
After recording the notice of contract on Lot 26, nothing happened for several years (R.
at 535). Then, the owner of both Lots 26 and 27 conveyed Lot 27 free and clear of any
easements in 1984.1 (R. at 606 and 535). After this point in time, Ralom Investment
Company, the owner of Lot 26, did not own Lot 27 and thus could not thereafter convey
an easement over Lot 27. (R. at 535). See also, Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready
Mix, 89 P.3d 155 (Utah 2004) (stranger to record title cannot convey interest in
property).

In 1993, nine years after Lot 27 had been conveyed free and clear of any

easement, Ralom Investment Company who no longer owned Lot 27 and thus had no
interest in Lot 27 to convey, purported to convey Lot 26 with an easement over Lot 27 to
Ben Aire Associates via warranty deed. (R. at 608-610). That warranty deed was not
recorded against Lot 27. (R. at 613-624). None of the conveyances of Lot 27 ever
included a reference to the purported easement. (R. at 613-624).
Additionally, HTC procured a title report from its title insurer covering Lot 27

1

This factual scenario extinguished whatever might have existed of the easement by
Merger. "A servitude is terminated when all the benefits and burdens come into a single
ownership. Transfer of a previously benefited or burdened parcel into separate
ownership does not revive a servitude terminated under the rule of the section."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 7.5 2000.
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prior to entering into the Ground Lease. The purported easement on Lot 27, mentioned
only in documents recorded against Lot 26, is not "excepted" from HTC's title insurance
policy. (R. at 531 and 591-601). Nor would one expect it to be. Utah has a race-notice
recording statute. U.C.A. § 57-3-103 (2000). An encumbrance or restriction on the use
of real property such as an easement recorded on the wrong parcel of real property might
just as well not be recorded at all. Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 791 (Utah 2002)
(recorded deed that fails to describe "the same real property . . . or any portion of it," has
no effect on validity of later recorded deed). Utah law simply does not recognize an
encumbrance or restriction, such as the purported easement in this case, that is not
recorded on the property it purports to encumber as such a recording gives no notice to
someone investigating title to the property. Utah title insurers rely on this principle of
law in performing their businesses. (R. at 544).
Not only is there no easement recorded against Lot 27, but there is no evidence on
the real property that an easement exists. There is nothing on the ground that would give
a purchaser notice that there was an easement on Lot 27. Indeed, the route of the

2

HTC relies on expert opinion from Joseph Capilli for the proposition that somehow this
unrecorded easement of which no one had notice, and for which there has never been
evidence on the ground, might nevertheless constitute a "cloud" on Brown's title.
Interestingly, before he was a paid expert in this case for the Petitioner, Mr. Capilli's title
company issued a title policy to HTC that did not except the supposed easement. (R. at
531 and 591-601). Under these facts, the Trial Court appropriately rejected Mr. Capilli's
paid opinion testimony in favor of his title company's opinion before this dispute arose.
Actions, especially those taken before a suit begins, speak louder than words. See, Coray
v. Ogden Union Rv. & Depot Co., 180 P.2d 542, 549 (Utah 1947)("his actions speak
louder than words").
12

purported easement has been impassable since before Brown purchased the property.
Storage units have now been on the real property covering the path of the purported
easement for over ten years and the purported easement has never been used. (R. at 544).
Not only is there no indication that an easement ever did exist, there is nobody claiming
an easement over the property. (R. at 928, Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, pp.
6-8). Petitioner never articulated to the Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals any legal
argument that under Utah law subjects Lot 27 to any easement.
In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of May 1, 2007, Third
Judicial District Court Judge John Paul Kennedy stated unequivocally that there is no
easement on Lot 27. See, R. at 827, Conclusions of Law, f 1, "There is no easement on
lot 27. There is no evidence of an easement on the ground and to the extent that an
easement purporting to affect lot 27 is recorded against lot 26, that easement is void
because it was not recorded against lot 27." See also, R. at 827, Conclusions of Law, f 2,
"Because there is no easement affecting lot 27, there is no basis for the HTC's claims
against the defendant and this action should not have been brought against the landlord,
causing the landlord to incur costs." The Court of Appeals affirmed "the district court's
ruling dismissing HTC's claims." See, Court of Appeals' Opinion, filed November 20,
2008, ^[13, attached as Addendum B to Appellant's Brief.
HTC has continued to pursue claims based on an easement that does not exist in
their title insurance policy, that has never been recorded against the real property in
question, for which there is no evidence on the property, which has been found by the
13

Trial Court not to exist, which finding has never been challenged. Its efforts are all
aimed at forcing Brown to renegotiate a lease with an option to purchase that was written
in such a way as to preserve the Brown family's limited retirement fund.
n.

BY THE TERMS OF THE GROUND LEASE, HTC HAS STANDING
TO PURSUE A QUIET TITLE ACTION.

HTC's argument that they do not have standing to pursue a quiet title action is,
like all of HTC's arguments, academic at best as it relies on HTC baseless assertion that
there is an easement over Lot 27. Because there is no easement on Lot 27, there is
nothing for either Brown or HTC to challenge.
The Court of Appeals specifically noted in its Opinion that this standing issue
need not be answered in abstract terms because the specific language of the Ground
Lease resolves this issue as to these parties. See, Court of Appeals' Opinion, filed
November 20, 2008, f 9, attached as Addendum B to Appellant's Brief. The parties
agreed that HTC would have the right to contest the legality of a covenant, restriction, or
condition of record should the situation arise during the course of the lease term:
"[tjenant shall have the right, at its own expense, to contest or review by appropriate legal
or administrative proceeding the validity or legality of any . . . . " (R. at 20-21)(Emphasis
added). "Covenants, restrictions, and conditions now or hereafter of record which may
be applicable to Tenant or to all or any portion of the Premises, or to the use, occupancy,
possession, operation, maintenance, alteration, repair or restoration of any of the
Premises," even if compliance with such requirements "results in interference with the
14

use or enjoyment of all or any portion of the Premises." (R. at ll)(Italics added).
Having conveyed a long term lease with an option to purchase the property to Petitioner,
it only makes sense that Brown would also confer upon Petitioner the right to protect
those existing and potential interests, particularly where the lease was intended to
preserve the Brown's limited retirement fund against cost or offset.

None of the cases

cited by Petitioner support the contention that a party, such as Petitioner, who has a long
term lease and an option to purchase this property, has an insufficient interest in this
property to confer standing. Indeed, the very quote cited by Petitioner in its Petition for
Writ of Certiorari but conveniently not included in its Appellant's Brief, answers the
question: "[standing to bring a quiet title action to perfect title is limited to parties who
could acquire an interest in the property created by the court's judgment or decree."
Elder v. Nephi City, 2007 UT 46, f 20, 164 P.3d 1238. Petitioner already has an interest
in the property as the holder of a long term lease. Petitioner "could acquire" even the fee
interest by exercise of the option. This Court has already determined that the interest
HTC has would be sufficient to bring a quiet title action, if there were an actual easement
on this property, which there is not. Given the facts of this case, the standing issue is
another red herring.
Contrary to what Petitioner would have this Court believe through its citations to
non-Utah cases, the Utah Supreme Court has not categorically rejected the notion that
standing can arise from an agreement and has, in fact held that "[a]s in many states, we
find that in Utah standing acquired by stipulation is enforceable."
15

In re E.H., 2006 UT

36, f 52, 137 P.3d 809, 820 (2006). By both parties agreeing to the language of the
Ground Lease which clearly indicates that HTC may, independently of the Browns,
challenge an easement, "to the extent it may have any validity" (See Court of Appeals
Opinion, ^[12, attached as Addendum B to the Appellant's Brief), the parties stipulated to
give HTC standing to quiet title should it have been necessary.
in.

"COVENANTS, RESTRICTIONS, AND CONDITIONS" AS
REFERRED TO IN THE GROUND LEASE ARE NOT CC&R'S -A LEGAL TERM OF ART.

Petitioner argues that the Trial Court and subsequently the Court of Appeals, by
finding that an easement falls under the definition of "Legal Requirement" as defined in
the Ground Lease, would wreak "havoc" on landlord/tenant contract law. HTC argues,
referring to the application of the Plain Meaning Rule, that the Court of Appeals
"disregarded this principle by failing to recognize the well-established distinction
between the meaning of the terms 'easements' and 'covenants, conditions, and
restrictions.'" See, Appellant's Brief, p. 14. The problem with this argument is that in
making it, Petitioner refers to a term that is nowhere contained in the Ground Lease. For
the first time in these proceedings, HTC argues that the contract language "covenants,
restrictions, and conditions" is a reference to the legal term of art "CC&R's." The record
does not support such an assertion.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions when

referred to in that order have come to be known in the law as CC&R's and have in fact
become a legal term of art. See, Moler v. CW Management Corp., 190 P.3d 1250,
1251 (Utah 2008)("At the time the Molers first met with Redfeather Estates' real estate
16

agent, Christopher McCandless, the homes in Redfeather Estates were burdened with
covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC & Rs")"); See also, Peters v. Pine Meadow
Ranch Home Ass'n, 151 P.3d 962, 963 (Utah 2007)("The Association seeks to levy such
fees against Petitioner Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, L.L.C.
("Forest Meadow") based on covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC & Rs")");
Dansie v. Hi Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 92 P.3d 162 (UT App. 2004)(Court of
Appeals makes reference to "CC & Rs" in opinion without any reference to the fact that
CC&R refers to covenants, conditions, and restrictions).
The universality of the order in which these words are used when invoking the
legal term of art argue against construing the Ground Lease in light of the law governing
CC&R's because the legal term of art was not used. The Ground Lease does not employ
the legal term of art "covenants, conditions, and restrictions" or CC&R's as they have
come to be known. Rather, the Ground Lease never uses the acronym, CC&R, and refers
to the individual terms covenants, restrictions, and conditions in the much broader
sentence "all covenants, restrictions, and conditions now or hereafter of record which
may be applicable to Tenant or to all or any portion of the premises . . ." (R. at 11). It is
illogical to conclude that by the mere use of three words that, when used in a specific
order, form a legal term of art with a specific meaning, the parties intended that same
meaning when they changed the order of the words so as not to state the term of art. Had
the parties intended to refer to CC&R's, a concept with a specific legal meaning, they
would have used those specific words in the specific order in which they are used when
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referring to the term of art. Instead, the Ground Lease used those three words- covenants,
restrictions, and conditions - in a different order, emphasizing the plain meaning of the
individual words rather than invoking the term of art. As a result, the Court of Appeals
conclusion that "[t]he Easement, to the extent it may have any validity, is clearly a
covenant, restriction, or condition of record..." is based on the plain meaning of the terms
contained in the Ground Lease. See, Court of Appeals' Opinion, ^[12, attached to
Appellant's Brief as Addendum B.
IV.

THE SUPPOSED DICHOTOMY BETWEEN AN EASEMENT AND
OTHER CONDITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS OF TITLE IS AS
IMAGINARY AS THE SUPPOSED EASEMENT IN THIS CASE.

Much of the weight of Petitioner's argument rests on the supposed dichotomy
between an easement on the one hand and restrictive covenants or restrictions on the
other. Petitioner posits that if the Court of Appeals is upheld in this case it will plunge
this heretofore clear area of the law into chaos.
Actually, the law in this area has been less than lucid since the various doctrines of
covenants running with the land, easements, and restrictions emerged in the English
common law.

This Court recognized this confusion over terms in Flying Diamond Oil

Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989), with the following caricature of
one of the nations most revered jurists: "The 'spell of the dry grins' which a reference to
covenants running with the land provoked in Mr. Justice Holmes may be taken as
indicative of that great jurist's fortitude; tears of frustration might be a more characteristic
reaction of less Spartan spirits attempting to investigate the subject."
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It is clear from a short perusal of the law in this area that, as stated by the Utah
Court of Appeals in Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch County, 40 P.3d
1148 at n. 5 (Utah App. 2001), "the terms negative easement and restrictive covenant are
often used interchangeably."

Nor does Petitioner's forced dichotomy appear any more

pronounced in jurisdictions outside Utah. See, e.g., Petty v. Hill, 2006 WL 2808626
(Cal.App. Oct. 3, 2006) (restrictive covenants are enforced as equitable servitudes).
Indeed, easements, covenants, and restrictions are all treated with equal dignity even
under the tax codes; Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. C.I.R., 131 T.C. No. 10, 2008
WL 4757336, (U.S. Tax Ct., Oct. 30, 2008) ("A perpetual conservation restriction is a
qualified real property interest . . . A 'Perpetual conservation restriction' is a restriction
granted in perpetuity on the use which may be made of real property-including, an
easement or other interest in real property that under state law has attributes similar to an
easement (e.g., a restrictive covenant or equitable servitude)").
This is not to say that this Court would be incapable of untying the Gordian knot
and lending clarity to what has never been all that clear, but this case may not be the best
vehicle for undertaking such a task. Here the distinction between a covenant running
with the land and an easement or a restriction on use of the property is not germane to the
question faced by the courts below, i.e., whether Brown is in breach of the lease by not
pursuing an unrecorded, unused and blocked easement against parties unknown that have
never asserted the easement. Whatever the Petitioner imagines this supposed condition to
be, it falls within the parties' contemplation that the tenant could contest it, abide it, or
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ignore it, so long as they did not deplete the Brown family's retirement fund in the
process. An advisory opinion in this would not appear to be the kind of decision that
would lend clarity to this tortured area of the law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Respondent Brown Family Holdings, L.C.,
respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals decision in this matter be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED and DATED this l^L day of August, 2009.
LAW OFFICES, P.C.

ttldn
O
BlrfkeS. Atkin
O
"\
Joseph H. Pugsley
^
[ttorneysfor Respondent/Appellee
Brown Family Holdings, LC

3

HTC simply cannot square its actions in this case with its agreement that "tenant agrees
that the amount of annual rent will be paid without offset and that tenant will pay all
imposition and cost relating to the property so that the Landlord has no cost or expense
relating to the property during the term or an extension of the lease" See, R. at 14.
Italics added.
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